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ABSTRACT 
 
    We show in a theoretical model that benefits of allocating additional attention to evaluating 
the marginal attribute with in choice set depend upon the expected utility loss from making a 
suboptimal choice as a result of ignoring that incremental attribute. Guided by this analysis, we 
then develop a very general and practical empirical method for measuring the individual's 
propensity to attend to attributes. As a proof of concept, we offer an empirical example of our 
method using a conjoint analysis of demand for programs to reduce health risks. Our results 
suggest that respondents differentially allocate attention across attributes, as a function of the 
mix of attribute levels in a choice set. This behavior can cause researchers who fail to model 
attention allocation to incorrectly estimate the marginal utilities derived from selected attributes. 
This illustrative example is a first attempt to implement an attention-corrected choice model with 
a sample of field data from a conjoint choice experiment. 
     
     
    Acknowledgements: Our recognition of the need for this paper was crystallized by discussions 
in the session entitled "Dissecting the Random Component" at the Fifth Triennial Invitational 
Choice Symposium hosted by UC Berkeley at Asilomar in Pacific Grove, CA, in June 2001. 
Valuable feedback was obtained from presentation of the theory section in the session entitled 
"Recent Progress on Endogeneity in Choice Modeling" at the Sixth Triennial Invitational Choice 
Symposium in Estes Park, CO in June 2004. Initial empirical results supporting the model were 
presented in the session entitled "Behavioral Frontiers in Choice Models" at the Seventh 
Triennial Invitational Choice Symposium at the Wharton School in Philadelphia, PA, in June 
2007. We are grateful to all of the participants at these sessions who have influenced our 
thinking on this topic, as well as to members of the Triangle Resource and Environmental 
Economics seminar sponsored by NC State, RTI, and Duke University, and the 10th Occasional 
Workshop on Environmental and Resource Economics at UCSB. This research was supported in 
part by the National Science Foundation (SES-0551009) and by the Raymond F. Mikesell 
Foundation at the University of Oregon. 
 
 
Differential Attention to Attributes in Utility-theoretic Choice Models 
1 Introduction 
 
    Simple choice models assume that the investigator knows exactly what information the 
individual uses to make their choice—i.e. that individuals fully attend to, and costlessly process, 
all the information presented to them within a choice scenario. Economists, and choice modelers 
more generally, now recognize that the constituent elements of attention, including cognition and 
time, are scarce resources which rational individuals should allocate optimally (Simon, 1955; 
March, 1978; Heiner, 1985; de Palma, et al., 1994; Conlisk, 1996; Gabiax and Laibson, 2000). 
The optimal allocation of attention across attributes of alternatives will depend upon both the 
marginal benefits and the marginal costs of further information processing. As a consequence, 
prior to making a choice, the individual may rationally attend to some attributes of an alternative 
more than others. 
    However, this process of optimally allocating attention over the array of information in a 
choice set may create a profound problem for discrete choice researchers. Suppose an individual 
does value the level of a particular attribute, but because of some resource constraint, overlooks 
differences in its levels across alternatives when making their choice. A random utility empirical 
model, based on perfect and costless information, will imply that the marginal utility associated 
with that attribute is zero. Incomplete attention to any particular attribute, as opposed to zero 
attention, could be expected to result in a less-than-expected effect of variations in the level of 
that attribute on the individual's choice. The apparent marginal utility in this case would be an 
attenuated estimate of the true marginal utility under perfect and costless information.1 
                                                 
1 If this inattention effect is uniform across attributes, then all of the indirect utility parameters may be 
proportionally attenuated. This is observationally equivalent to the case where the scale factor in a discrete-choice 
    Further complications may arise if the individual's allocation of attention differs systematically 
across particular types of attributes. For example, consider the case of estimating demand for 
goods in economic applications. Individuals might allocate a disproportionate level of attention 
to an alternative's price as opposed to other attributes. Distortions in willingness to pay (WTP) 
would then be expected. Relatively less attenuation in the estimated marginal utility of net 
income will tend to preserve the magnitude of the denominator in the usual WTP calculation. 
Relatively more attenuation for the marginal utilities of other attributes will result in biases 
toward zero for the implied marginal WTP estimates for each non-price attribute (so that overall 
WTP may be biased toward zero as well). 
    In this paper, we derive some results based on pre-choice optimization behavior which lead to 
guidelines for empirical specifications. We develop a theoretical model that motivates our 
methodological approach, which we then illustrate with an empirical example. We argue that the 
benefits from additional attention allocated to the evaluation of an incremental attribute stem 
from the expected value of the avoided lost utility associated with a suboptimal choice (made as 
a result of ignoring that incremental attribute). The expected magnitude of this utility loss 
depends upon two components. The first component is the "other-attribute utility dissimilarity," 
which represents how close, in utility space, the alternatives appear to be---given the other 
attributes evaluated thus far. The second component is the "own-attribute utility dissimilarity." 
This component captures how much of a difference might be made to the overall utility from 
each alternative by taking into account this incremental attribute. 
    Our theoretical model leads us to develop a practical implementation of its insights, so that 
empirical choice specifications can accommodate the individual's "propensity to attend" to each 
                                                                                                                                                             
model is smaller (i.e., the error variance is larger). With proportional attenuation, when an individual is paying less 
attention, we would expect to see no bias created in the implied point estimate of marginal WTP for that attribute. 
different attribute in a choice scenario. Conceptually, this propensity to attend to an incremental 
attribute is identified based on individual-specific measures of other- and own-attribute utility 
dissimilarities as well as the cognitive costs of attribute evaluation. We introduce a multiplicative 
propensity-to-attend parameter for each attribute which can be viewed equivalently as affecting 
either the apparent marginal utility associated with the marginal attribute, or the perceived 
difference in the level of this attribute across the two alternatives. 
    As a proof of concept, we offer an empirical example of our method using a conjoint analysis 
of demand for programs to reduce health risks. Our results suggest that the combination of other-
attribute dissimilarity and own-attribute dissimilarity causes respondents to differentially allocate 
attention across attributes. More specifically, this process results in a tendency for the researcher 
to overestimate the marginal utility derived from net income, overestimate the marginal disutility 
of sick-years and lost-life-years, and perhaps to underestimate the marginal disutility of 
recovered-years, on average. 
    Although there is certainly a great deal of room to expand the theoretical scope of our model, 
the empirical version of this simple attention-corrected model is important for several reasons. 
First, the attention-corrected model has to potential to identify and eliminate distortions in the 
estimated parameters of discrete choice models which are estimated using either revealed or 
stated preference data. Second, it provides a clear measurement framework to test emerging 
hypotheses from the behavioral literature about the determinants of an individual's allocation of 
attention. Third, when the consequentiality of choices varies from context to context, we might 
also expect the individual's budgeted attention to vary as well. Our attention-corrected model 
might also be used to explain some types of observed differences across data generation methods 
(such as revealed versus stated preference information). Fourth, it opens up the possibility of 
beginning to measure the effectiveness of agents (such as marketers, salespeople, politicians, etc) 
who strategically seek to direct the individual's attention towards some attributes and away from 
others as they design choice sets. The extent, and implications, of such strategic behavior on 
choice outcomes, and therefore upon individual welfare, cannot be assessed adequately without 
the benefit of a framework with features similar to those of the model presented here. 
    The scope of the theoretical model is modest; it emphasizes the role of the expected marginal 
benefits in determining the allocation of attention. Our available data do not contain sufficient 
information to allow us to assess empirically the separate role of cognitive costs in the allocation 
of attention. An illustration of this process awaits richer data. We acknowledge some past 
research which has touched on this subject and encourage future researchers to develop data sets 
which will permit more-comprehensive models. The present paper also focuses only on the 
allocation of attention to the marginal attribute. We leave a similar analysis of optimal attention 
to the marginal alternative for a subsequent paper.2 
1.1 Related literature 
    Economists have long recognized the individuals face various resource constraints in 
processing and deploying information in their decision-making processes (Simon, 1955; March, 
1978; Heiner, 1985; de Palma, et al., 1994; Conlisk, 1996). Theoretical models that predict how 
individual might optimally respond to such constraints have only recently begun to emerge 
(Gabiax and Laibson; 2000, 2005) and be tested in experimental settings (Gabaix et al., 2006). 
While many advances have recently been introduced that inform the design of attribute-based 
                                                 
2 The notion of Individual-specific "consideration sets" of relevant alternatives has been addressed in Haab and 
Hicks (1999), Chakravarti and Janiszewski (2003), Paulssen and Bagozzi (2005) and Jedidi and Kohli (2005). 
field studies of demand, no general methods exist for directly modeling the effects of the 
allocation of attention on the estimated marginal utilities (or part-worths) for these attributes.3 
    In developing a directed cognition model, Gabaix and Laibson (2000; 2005) approximate the 
economic value of additional attention using two ideas stemming from the analysis of option 
values. First, the option value of continued consideration declines as one alternative gains a large 
edge over other available alternatives. In the context of the present paper, this corresponds to the 
case where alternatives come to be perceived as less similar in terms of the utility they generate 
(i.e. when one alternative clearly dominates the other(s) in terms of the current information set). 
Second, the option value also declines when continued consideration yields little new 
information. In the context of the present paper, this corresponds to the case where additional 
attributes are more similar across alternatives or as units of these additional attributes provide 
minimal marginal utility. 
    Overall, the experimental results in Gabaix et al. (2006) are consistent with two implications 
of their option value framework, which defines how many search operations the subject should 
pursue. First, the value of [attribute] exploration [for a given alternative] decreases the larger that 
gap between the active [alternative] and the next best [alternative]. Second, the value of 
[attribute] exploration increases with the variability of the information that will be obtained (p. 
1053). When extended to their yoked case, where an additional attribute is revealed 
simultaneously for all alternatives, these insights appear to be essentially equivalent to the ones 
we derive analytically in this paper, in the context of a conventional empirical random utility 
choice model. 
                                                 
3 Swait and Adamowicz (2001b) take to task the empirical choice modeling community for its persistence in 
assuming a "utility-maximizing, omniscient, indefatigable consumer." 
    The Gabaix et al. (2006) experimental design eliminates the need to measure physical 
quantities of an attribute, to estimate the marginal utility associated with that attribute, or to infer 
the marginal WTP for units of each attribute by considering marginal rates of substitution 
between that particular attribute and money. Attributes cannot differ in their salience across 
individuals, since utility is implicitly considered to map directly into the total number of cents 
paid. However, real choice situations in field settings are confounded by heterogeneity in 
marginal utilities across attributes, differences in attribute metrics, as well as differences in 
individuals' cognitive abilities and the opportunity costs of their time.4 
    Many advances have recently occurred with respect to the design of attribute-based field 
studies of demand but they fall short of the goal of modeling the allocation of attention.5 Hensher 
and co-authors have initiated several intriguing explorations of attention within standard 
multivariate discrete choice setting. Hensher, et al. (2005) use a specific follow-up question 
about which attributes the respondent did not use in making his or her choices. Hensher et al. 
(2007) also uses the same followup question to identify nine distinct attribute processing rules in 
the same. Respondent adherence to these rules is modeled as stochastic. They then use a 
modified mixed logit model which conditions each parameter on whether a respondent included 
or excluded an attribute in their information processing strategy. In their conclusions, these 
authors acknowledge that there may be differences "between what people say they think and 
what they really think" (p. 216), and they question whether the "simply conscious statements" 
                                                 
4 The choice experiments in Fischer et al. (2000b) use the same Mouselab software as do Gabaix 
et al. (2006), but the choice data from their study is not utilized in an econometric random utility 
model. 
 
5 Psychologists have explored how various within choice set conditions may increase the cognitive costs of attribute 
evaluation and comparison (Bettman et al., 1998; Dellaert et al., 1999; Fisher et al. 2000a,b; Luce 2003; Johnson, 
2008). Similarly, marketing scholars and others have explored the effects of task complexity on choice outcomes 
(Shugan, 1980; Malhotra, 1982; Mazzotta and Opaluch, 1995). 
made by survey respondents represent an adequate measure of information processing. They 
emphasize that individuals' information processing strategies "should be built into the estimation 
of choice data from stated choice studies"(p. 214). This is precisely what we endeavor to 
accomplish in the present paper. 
    Employing a similar research method, Hensher et al (2006a) find that that probability of a 
respondent considering more attributes decreases as the set of attributes used in their survey are 
drawn from distributions with narrower ranges. However, attribute ranges in this study appear to 
be varied simultaneously across all attributes and the dependent variable is available only at the 
level of the individual, not the choice set. In contrast, our models lead us to consider differences 
in the ranges of attributes within a single choice set as additional potential determinants of 
attention, and therefore of apparent marginal utilities and ultimately our estimates of WTP. Very 
relevant to our study is Hensher's finding that individuals' processing strategies depend on the 
nature of the attribute information in the choice set, not just the quantity of such information (i.e. 
the number of attributes). 
    Finally, there is large literature that explores how the design of choice sets effect individuals 
choice consistency and willingness to pay. Early versions of these include Mazzotta and Opaluch 
(1995) and DeShazo and Fermo (2002), leading up to the very ambitious "design-of-designs" 
studies by Hensher (2006b). Much of this work, however, is motivated by a concern with how 
the cognitive costs of information processing vary with choice set design. Our focus in the 
present paper concerns how the expected benefit from additional information drives the 
allocation of attention across attributes. In addition, these other papers emphasize how, through 
deliberate manipulation of choice set design, the researcher can alter the estimated parameters. 
We contend that even if all of the survey instruments in a study employ the same choice set 
design (in terms of numbers of attributes, alternatives, choice sets, attribute levels, and ranges) 
there can still be artifacts of the researcher's design decisions, with respect to the mix of 
attributes in any given choice set, that can unintentionally or intentionally affect the recovered 
parameter estimates. Furthermore, these effects can vary across individuals. 
2 A Theoretical Model for Attention to Attributes 
    Suppose subjects in an SP choice experiment (or in observed RP choice data) actually do care 
about the level of a particular attribute, but for some reason (perhaps this attribute is more 
difficult to perceive than other attributes) they overlook its levels when making their choice. In 
this situation, a random utility empirical model, based on perfect and costless information, will 
imply that the marginal utility associated with that attribute is zero. Likewise, simply incomplete 
attention to any particular attribute, as opposed to zero attention, could be expected to result in a 
lesser-than-expected effect of variations in the level of that attribute on people's choices. The 
apparent marginal utility in this case would be an attentuated estimate of the "true" marginal 
utility under perfect and costless information. 
    If the subject's cognitive resources are limited, but this "inattention effect" is uniform across 
attributes, then perhaps all of the indirect utility parameters may be proportionally attenuated. 
This is observationally equivalent to the case where the "scale factor" in a discrete-choice model 
is smaller (i.e. the error variance is larger). If the propensity to attend to attributes is scaled down 
equally for all attributes (including net income) when an individual is paying less attention, we 
would expect to see no bias created in the implied point estimate of marginal WTP for that 
attribute. The ratio of the marginal utility associated with any attribute, relative to the marginal 
utility of income, is typically all that matters in simple models.6 
    However, it is possible that inattention to attributes differs across attributes. In particular, 
when decision resources are limited, there may remain a disproportionate level of attention 
devoted to an alternative's cost as opposed to other attributes. In this case, distortions in WTP 
could be expected. Relatively less attenuation in the estimated marginal utility of income will 
inflate the denominator relative to the numerator in the usual WTP calculation, so that the 
implied WTP for every alternative could be biased toward zero. In contrast, in the context of 
stated preference models, there is great concern that because of the hypothetical nature of the 
choices involved, the subject will fail to pay sufficient attention to the cost variable. The 
emphasis on providing a "cheap talk" script as part of the survey is designed to draw the 
respondent's attention specifically to the cost variable and its implications. Disproportionate 
attention to the implications of the cost variable may serve to amplify attention to this attribute 
relative to other attributes when the expected utility loss is otherwise rather low because of the 
less directly consequential nature of most stated preferences choices. When other attributes of the 
offered alternatives are not similarly emphasized, offering only a cheap talk script--generally 
intended to increase the apparent marginal utility of income--can be expected to produce a 
downward bias in estimated willingness to pay (relative to a scenario which worked equally hard 
to draw respondents' scarce attention toward other attributes). 
    In this paper, we derive some results based on optimization behavior which lead to guidelines 
for empirical specifications. Our models concern how the individual's optimal amount of 
                                                 
6 Conlon et al. (2001) use response time as a proxy for consumer effort devoted to a choice, where effort is regressed 
on choice set characteristics and involvement measures. One choice set characteristic is the expected utility 
difference across alternatives, based on a preliminary multinomial logit choice model. 
attention to a particular attribute might be determined by the nature of the decision context and 
how this context interacts with the preferences of that individual. 
2.1 A Two­Alternative Case 
    Consider first a familiar binary choice model (with alternatives indexed by 0 and 1) where the 
underlying indirect utility function is linear and additively separable in net income (i.e.  ji iY T
= income minus the cost of option j) and in each of several other attributes, ,  1,...,kiX k K . 
(1) 
 
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The utility-difference expression driving the choice between alternatives 1 and 0 can thus be 
written as: 
(2) 
     1 0 0 1 1 0 1 01 2
1 2
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K
i k ki ik
V V T T X X
t x
   
  


      
   

  
where    0 1 1 01 1 1i i i i i iT T X X x t       is sometimes distinguished from the other attribute 
differences because of the role of its coefficient, 1 , in the calculation of willingness to pay 
(WTP). In general, lower case variable names will be used to denote differences in attribute 
levels between alternative 1 and alternative 0, or net levels of attributes in this two-alternative 
context. 
    In this simple linear specification, WTP is calculated by setting the utility difference to zero 
and solving for the level of *it  which creates this indifference between alternatives. The implied 
WTP and E[WTP] functions are 
 
(3) 
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2.1.1 Marginal Benefit of Attention to an Additional Attribute 
    The marginal benefit to the individual of paying attention to an additional attribute can be 
equated to the avoided expected utility loss from making an incorrect choice by ignoring kX  in 
the choice process. There are two ways that the subject can experience a loss from failing to 
consider kX . First, she might choose alternative 1, when in fact (i.e. on the basis of the full set of 
attributes) her utility would actually be higher under alternative 0. Or, she might choose 
alternative 0 when her utility would actually be higher under alternative 1 if all attributes were 
taken into account. Her expected utility loss from failing to consider the level of X_{k} will be: 
(4) 
    
  
0 1
1 0
 Pr 1 | 0 
                    + Pr 0 |1 
i i
i i
E U Loss chosen optimal V V
chosen optimal V V
 
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Let the full (true) utility-difference function be 
(5) 
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where each attribute-difference term 1 0ki ki kix X X   concerns a single attribute k and its 
associated single indirect utility-difference coefficient, k . In a linear additively separable 
model, this coefficient will be the same as the marginal utility of kX . 
    The second line of equation (5) illustrates our convention for referring to the complete inner 
product, 'ix  , of all attribute differences and their associated coefficients that actually enter into 
the systematic portion of the individual's utility function. The third line of the equation shows 
how we decompose this inner product into two terms, one being the inner product of all attribute 
differences other than kix  and their corresponding parameters, denoted 
'
ki kx   , and the other 
being the thk  attribute difference and its own coefficient, ki kx  . 
    The probability that alternative 1 or alternative 0 is truly optimal for the individual (based on a 
full consideration of all attributes and their differences) would be given by 
(6) 
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' '
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i i i i
i i
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In contrast, if the individual completely ignores attribute x_{k} (either because he or she does 
not think or bother to consider it, or believes incorrectly that it confers zero marginal utility), the 
probabilities of the observed choices will depend only on the levels of the other attributes, the 
vector x_{-k}: 
(7) 
 
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' '
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ki k i i ki k
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There are thus two ways for the individual to make a "mistake." The subject could choose 
alternative 1 when alternative 0 is optimal, or choose 0 when 1 is optimal. 
(8) 
     
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It is a crucial assumption that we are talking about the same random error, i , for each 
inequality. This is the portion of utility that is unobserved by the investigator, but known to the 
individual. It is typically assumed to account for all other unspecified attributes of each 
alternative, other than 1ix  through kix , perhaps interacted with respondent characteristics, which 
drive the individual's choice. If the same error term is involved in each case in the probability 
formulas in (8), then the intersection of each pair of events is sometimes empty, depending upon 
the sign of ki kx  . Recall that ' ki kx   + ki kx   is just 'ix  , the systematic portion of the true 
indirect utility-difference. Thus    ' 'Pr i i i ki kx x          is nonzero only when ki kx   is 
positive, and    ' 'Pr i i i ki kx x          is nonzero only when ki kx   is negative. 
    The utility loss from the wrong choice due to ignoring kix  is equal to 
1 0V V , but the 
magnitude of this true utility difference is assumed to be unknown, ex ante. For any given ex 
post utility difference, the expected utility loss will be given by the probability of each type of 
mistake, time the resulting utility loss if such a mistake is made. Substituting these probabilities 
into the expected utility loss due to a wrong choice,   E U Loss , yields the formula: 
(9) 
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Either  ki kx   and    ' 'ki k ki k ki kF x x F x          are both positive, or they are both negative. 
Therefore, the utility difference can be equivalently expressed in terms of the absolute values of 
both terms. 
(10)      ' ' 0 1 2 ki k ki k ki kE U Loss F x x F x V V           
    In words, the lost utility from an incorrect choice depends upon the sizes of the two absolute 
value terms in equation (10). The magnitude of the true utility-difference, 0 1V V  is unknown 
to the individual, ex ante. The first absolute value term, however, depends on two underlying 
quantities. We will call ' ki kx    the "other-attribute utility difference" and ki kx   the "own-
attribute utility difference." The argument inside the first absolute value term is the cumulative 
density between the two limits of an interval of the underlying random variable. The interval is 
anchored at ' ki kx   , the "other-attribute utility difference," and has a width given by ki kx  , the 
"own-attribute utility difference." It is simplest to address these in reverse order. 
2.1.2 Own­attribute utility differences,  ki kx   
    This quantity describes the width of the interval of the distribution of ɛ over which the 
probability of making an incorrect choice is calculated. The different utility contributions due to 
the thk  attribute itself, ki kx  , through their contribution to the expected utility loss from an 
incorrect choice, will affect the propensity to attend to the thk  attribute. The term ki kx   can be 
large either if kix  is large in absolute magnitude or if k  is large in absolute magnitude. We thus 
expect that the propensity to attend will be greater, the greater the (positive or negative) 
contribution of this attribute to overall utility levels. If an attribute does not differ at all across 
alternatives, it should get little attention in the choice process. If the difference in the level of an 
attribute across alternatives (the range of levels for this attribute) is larger, then there is a greater 
likelihood that the subject will take this attribute into account in choosing between the two 
alternatives, ceteris paribus. Likewise, the greater the true marginal utility associated with this 
attribute, the greater the likelihood that it will receive more attention. 
 
2.1.3 Other­attribute utility differences,  ' ki kx    
    This quantity describes the anchoring point for the interval of the distribution of ɛ over which 
the probability of making an incorrect choice is calculated. For a given value of ki kx  , it will be 
the case that    ' 'ki k ki k ki kF x x F x       , will be larger as the amount of cumulative density 
in this given-width interval of the distribution of i  is larger. In a typical random utility binary 
choice model, the error term is assumed to be standard logistic, and thus roughly bell-shaped and 
symmetric around zero. The cumulative density for such a distribution is thus greater when the 
interval is located near the middle of the distribution, rather than out in either tail. In general, 
then, the probability in question will be larger as ' ki kx    lies nearer to zero—namely, the more 
similar are the alternatives in terms of all attributes other than the thk  attribute. 
    We thus expect that the propensity to attend to the thk  attribute will be greater, the closer 
'
ki kx    is to zero—in words, when the utility-difference based on all but attribute kX  is very 
close to zero. This will happen when (a.) all of the individual attribute-differences comprising 
kix  are close to zero, or (b.) the levels of the attribute differences that make up kix  vary in an 
offsetting fashion within the individual's utility function. In words, benefits from paying 
attention to attribute k should be greatest when the choice based on the subset of attributes 
excluding attribute k is most difficult. 
2.2 Marginal Costs of Attention to an Additional Attribute 
    The theoretical model in the last section concerns the benefits from attention to an additional 
attribute. Certainly, the greater the marginal costs of considering an attribute, the larger must be 
those marginal benefits to induce the individual to pay attention to attribute k. The marginal 
(opportunity) costs to the individual of devoting attention to any incremental attribute k will 
depend on the individual's endowment of cognitive resources. There will be different demands 
on this cognitive capacity in any given time period. The forgone benefits from using this capacity 
elsewhere define the opportunity cost of using it in the choice task in question. While we cannot 
directly measure the marginal opportunity costs of attention to an additional attribute, we can 
hypothesize a number of properties they should exhibit. 
    Suppose that the individual's finite cognitive resources can be allocated either to improving the 
accuracy of the choice at hand, or to other tasks. Cognitive resources are likely to be 
heterogeneous, so that the first few units of attention to the choice task at hand will cost 
relatively little in terms of forgone ability to concentrate on other tasks. However, the marginal 
opportunity cost of attention to an additional attribute can be expected to increase in the number 
of attributes being considered. This implies that the greater the number of attributes in a choice 
scenario, the higher the marginal cost of attention to any specific attribute. When the same 
number of attributes is used for all choice sets in a study, of course, the size of this effect cannot 
be estimated. 
    Anything that improves the subject's ability to convert a given amount of cognitive resources 
into choice accuracy for the designated choice task (the "technology" for producing accurate 
choices) may uniformly reduce the opportunity cost of attention or "cognitive price" for attention 
to an an additional attribute. This factors could include advance preparation or training for the 
choice exercise, or previous experience with similar choice tasks.7 
                                                 
7 For example, if the subject is a member of a regular panel, there will be records of the number of similar choice 
experiments in which she has participated. Conversely, anything that makes it harder to do other cognitive tasks 
could affect the relative price of attention to the current choice task. For example, controlling for cognitive capacity, 
if a respondent is housebound or unable to work, he may be inclined to devote a greater share of his cognitive 
capacity to the choice exercise in question, rather than to other tasks. 
    Qualitatively, the number of other cognitive tasks across which the individual must allocate 
scarce cognitive resources can affect the optimal allocation of the resources to the choice task in 
question. It would be helpful to control for differences along this dimension by eliciting 
information about the extent to which the individual is preoccupied by other cognitive 
challenges.8 
    Factors which affect the marginal cost of attention to different attributes to different extents 
will be particularly important to consider. For example, consider the strategy by some advertisers 
to put important information about alternatives in the "fine print" of their offers. Or, consider 
national-level advertisements which merely advise the potential customer to "contact your local 
dealer for price information." The order of a particular attribute in a long list of product attributes 
(at the top, versus the middle or the bottom) may also affect the cost of paying attention to that 
attribute. 
    We mention considerations about differing marginal costs of attention to different attributes, at 
this point in the paper, for completeness. In the empirical example we offer in this paper, we do 
not have sufficient data (i.e. measured variability) in the marginal costs of attention to our 
different attributes that would make it possible to control for these types of differences in 
estimation. Any attention-cost variables in our inventory will affect the costs of attention to all 
attributes, and in most cases these are fixed across choice sets for each respondent. If these costs 
affect attention to all attributes proportionally, the outcome should be observationally equivalent 
to allowing for different scale factors for each individual's choices (with potentially no effect on 
                                                 
8 For student samples, this could include a measure of how crowded the student's calendar is (e.g. how many units 
they are currently taking or how many hours they work, or even how many hours of homework they already know 
that they must complete on the day of the choice experiment). Or, we might suspect that cognitive resources 
allocated to the choice task at hand are partially an artifact of other demands on the respondent's attention. 
Debriefing questions might attempt to elicit categorical or open-ended information concerning other problems that 
may be competing for the subject's attention at the time of the choice exercise. 
the relative sizes of the estimated marginal utilities). It may be important for future studies to 
collect sufficient information to explore the influence of differing marginal costs of attention to 
different attributes and the effect of these differences on estimated marginal utilities (and hence, 
potentially, on measures such as willingness to pay.) 
2.3 Multiple­Alternative Cases 
2.3.1 Generalized other­attribute effects 
    In the two-alternative case, we could make a strong case that the closeness of the two 
alternatives on the basis of their other attributes should increase the attention paid to each 
additional attribute. With just two alternatives. the simple absolute difference in systematic 
utilities according to other attributes, ' ki kx    will adequately capture the relevant properties of 
the choice set.9 
    With three or more alternatives, however, we need an analogous, but more general proxy for 
this information. We still wish to capture the extent to which there is a clear-cut "best" option 
among the available alternatives, based on all attributes other than this one. One possible 
measure would be the difference between the two leading alternatives, based on all attributes 
other than the one in question. We will call this statistic  ' ki klead x    the side of the lead, in 
utility units, enjoyed by the front-running alternative based on all other attributes. This statistic 
amounts to the absolute difference between the first two order statistics across alternatives for the 
other-attribute utility levels. In the three-alternative case, the researcher would need to calculate 
each of the indirect utility differences, relative to the numeraire third alternative:  1'ki kx   , 
                                                 
9 If differentiability proves helpful in whatever estimation method is used, this measure could proxied by 
 2' ki kx   . 
 2'ki kx    and 0. The two largest-valued differences would need to be identified (i.e. the largest 
value and the median value), and their absolute difference calculated. For any current set of 
estimates for the true marginal utility parameters  , this computation is tractable, but there is a 
risk that it will be awkward in a maximum likelihood context since this choice set statistic is not 
smoothly differentiable. 
    Other proxies can also be considered, however. The researcher can calculate the indirect utility 
differences,  1'ki kx   ,  2'ki kx    and 0, and compute the standard devation in these quantities. 
The greater the standard deviation in these measures, the more "different" are the alternatives in 
terms of all other attributes. We will denote this measure as  ' ki ksd x   . 
    It may also be relevant to compute the degree of skewness in these quantities across 
alternatives. In the three-alternative case, considered in our empirical section, the more positively 
skewed is this distribution of three systematic net utilities, the farther apart are the two highest 
values, relative to the lowest value. For a given standard deviation, greater positive skewness in 
the three-alternative case means there is more of a "clear winner" among the three alternatives in 
terms of "all but the thk attribute." We will call this measure  ' ki kskew x   . However, the same 
degree of skewness can be present for triples of values which have very different standard 
deviations, so it will be necessary to control for standard deviation before using skewness to 
measure the extent of a positive outlier in any triple of values. 
    A fourth candidate for dissimilarity might be an entropy measure, such as that employed in 
Swait and Adamowicz (2001). There is a roughly quadratic bound on entropy that varies 
systematically with the standard deviation, but the relationship is not exact (Duquette, 2008). 
    These various measures of the dissimilarity of alternatives based on other attributes (directly 
related to the extent to which there is a clear winner based on the other attributes) will be referred 
to generically as  ' ki kdissim x   . 
2.3.2 Generalized own­attribute effects 
    In the two-alternative case, the potential for the thk  attribute to change the identity of the 
winning alternative is also argued to be a logical determinant of attention to that thk attribute. 
This potential will depend both on the marginal utility associated with that attribute and the 
extent to which the level of that attribute differs across alternatives. If either component is large, 
the attribute will attract more attention. In the two-alternative case, simply the absolute 
difference ki kx   is sufficient to capture the combination of these two effects.10 
     In the multi-alternative case, the various utility-contributions across alternatives of the thk
attribute, relative to the numeraire alternative, must be taken into account. In the three-alternative 
case, these will be 1ki kx  , 2ki kx  , and 0. As for the other-attribute utility differences, we might 
postulate that attention to the thk  attribute should be increasing in size of the lead enjoyed by the 
alternative with the largest value for this utility contribution, which we will denote  ki klead x  . 
Alternatively, we might use standard deviation across alternatives of the utility-contributions due 
the thk attribute,  ki ksd x  and/or the skewness of the distribution across alternatives of these 
own-attribute effects:  ki kskew x  . 
                                                 
10 If a smoothly differentiable proxy for this quantity is required, perhaps  2ki kx  could be employed. 
    These various measures of dissimilarity of alternatives based on the attribute in question 
(directly related to the ability of this attribute to make a big difference to the overall utility levels 
from each alternative) will be referred to generically as  ki kdissim x  . 
3 Empirical Models for Attention to Attributes 
    Needed is a strategy to incorporate into a choice model any systematic differences in expected 
benefits (and costs, where possible) from attending to particular attributes. The researcher does 
not know whether there may be attributes which are truly relevant to the subject's choice decision 
but are more-or-less ignored because of the individual's benefit-cost assessment in terms of his or 
her scarce cognitive capacity and the avoided expected losses from an incorrect decision. All the 
investigator can determine is, on average, which attributes appear to be less relevant to choices 
and which attributes do seem to affect them. 
3.1 Propensity to Attend 
    We introduce the idea of a multiplicative "propensity to attend" parameter, kia , associated 
with the thk attribute. This propensity to attend can be viewed as affecting either the apparent 
marginal utility associated with the thk attribute (by converting k  to k kia  or the perceived 
difference in the level of this attribute across the two alternatives (by converting kix  to ki kia x . 
The indirect utility difference driving the basic conditional logit choice model in equation (2) can 
thus be recast as: 
(11) 1 0
1
K
i i k ki ki ik
V V a x     
We will let kia  vary systematically across individuals by allowing it to depend upon an "index" 
'
ki kZ   consisting of a vector of variables 'kiZ  and additional parameters k . There are certainly 
several potential strategies for incorporating systematically differing propensities to attend to 
different attributes in a choice set. Some of these might be: 
(12) 
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    The first formulation treats '1 ki kZ     directly as the propensity to attend without 
constraining the sign or size of this propensity factor. The second candidate formulation treats 
the index 'ki kZ   as a latent variable that can take on any value over the entire real line. However, 
if we use a function like an inverse log-odds transformation (a standard logistic cumulative 
density function) for F, we can restrict the effective value of the propensity factor to lie strictly 
between zero and one, with zero interpreted as "no attention" and one interpreted as "complete 
attention."11 The third formulation treats the propensity to attend to each attribute as simply a 
non-negative factor that scales the true marginal utility associated with an attribute either up or 
down as the value of this factor is greater or less than one. The sign of the underlying true 
                                                 
11 The slight inconvenience in estimating such a model stems from the starting starting values to be used. If all of the 
parameters k  are simultaneously zero, then ' 0.5ki ki ka F Z     . The apparent marginal utilities from a naive 
random utility specification would therefore be obtained from the first model in equation (12) only if the starting 
values for the k  parameters were all to be doubled. The default assumption  (i.e. 0k  ) is therefore that the "true" 
marginal utilities are actually twice what they appear to be in the naive model. As the index 'ki kZ   is larger, the true 
marginal utility will be less than twice its apparent naive value, while as the index is smaller, the true marginal 
utility will be more than twice its apparent naive value. In the limit, as 'ki kZ   goes to +∞, the implied propensity to 
attend goes to 1.0 and the associated k  corresponds to the true marginal utility.  The counterfactual of interest in 
this model corresponds to the question of what would have been the marginal utilities if the subject had been paying 
full attention to all attributes. The answers are contained in the estimates of each k from this specification. 
marginal utility, k , is thereby preserved. This assumption may be the most empirically 
hospitable one when a sign restriction is desired.12,13 
3.1.1 Implementation 
    Our theory section has suggested specific information that should be included among the kiZ  
variables that determine the subject's propensity to attend to the thk  attribute of the alternatives 
in the choice set. These factors contribute to the expected benefits (or the costs) of paying 
attention to a particular attribute. The propensity-to-attend measure, kia , should be some explicit 
function of how different the alternatives are in terms of the utility based on all other attributes, 
which we will denote by the construct that measures this in the two-alternative case, ' ki kx   , the 
difference across alternatives in utility derived from this attribute, denoted by ki kx   from the 
two-alternative case, and any available variables which capture the marginal cost of attention to 
this attribute, which may or may not differ across attributes k. 
    Taking the first specification in equation (12) as our example, we now differentiate among the 
generic coefficients in '1ki ki ka Z     , by distinguishing three types of parameters: 
(13)  ' '1ki k ki k k ki k ki ka x x C        
                                                 
12 Certainly, if a nonlinear model is used, and if analytical derivatives are to be employed, this formulation would be 
easier than the inverse log-odds transformation suggested for the case where marginal propensities are constrained to 
lie on the 0,1 interval. 
13 Fortunately, the ratios of estimated marginal utilities are all that matter for welfare estimates, and the "true" 
marginal utilities can be known only up to a scale factor. The relevant counterfactual in this case again concerns 
what would be the size of the estimated marginal utilities if all attributes received equal attention.  A logical value 
for this equal propensity to attend would be 1.0, which would also constitute a logical starting assumption, since  'exp 1ki ki ka Z    if ' 0ki kZ   , which will be the case if the vector of parameters k  is initially assumed to be a 
zero vector. 
where the vector 'kiC  is a set of variables, when available, that capture the individual's cognitive 
costs of evaluting attribute k. If 0k k k     , then the propensity to attend, kia , equals 
exactly one for all attributes, the desired case. 
    We do not necessarily expect the expressions that captures the benefits of attention 
 'k ki k k ki kx x       or the costs of attention  'ki kC   to be the same across attributes, because 
the constructed variables ' ki kx   , ki kx  , and possibly the relevant vector of variables 'kiC  will 
differ across attributes. However, it is possible that the incremental effects of the choice set 
design variables and individual characteristics that determine the net benefits of attention to 
attributes (i.e. the coefficients k and k  for benefits, or k for costs) could be the same across 
attributes k=1,...,K, so that the corresponding coefficients can be constrained to be equal across 
attributes as follows: 
(14) ' '1 ( )ki ki k ki k kia x x C         
Where possible, one should estimate models with and without these restrictions and test whether 
the restrictions can be rejected. These types of restrictions are possible because all of the 
variables in question for a  and   are in utility-units, not the units of the raw attributes. 
    Note that if the cost-of-attention variables do not differ quantifiably across attributes, so that 
' '
ki iC C , it may in fact be necessary to constrain k  . Otherwise, the attribute-specific 
parameters k  are likely to be difficult or impossible to identify separately from the marginal 
utilities, k . If we assume that the effect of the cost variables is the same across all attributes, 
especially if we adopt the version of kia  in the third line of equation (12), then kia  can be readily 
factored into two components:     ' 'exp expk ki k k ki k ki kx x C      and the implied form of 
the indirect utility difference will be: 
(15) 
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Since  'exp iC   is strictly positive and utility is invariant to the scale of measurement, we could 
divide through by  'exp iC   to produce a heteroskedastic model: 
(16)    1 0 ' '1 exp expK ii i k k ki k k ki k kik iV V x x x C           
In the model with a strictly positive propensity to attend to attributes, the variables 'iC  that 
capture cognitive cost differences across individuals can enter the model equivalently as factors 
that affect the dispersion in the conditional logit error term. Any variable that increases the 
overall cost of attention should tend to decrease the respondent's propensity to attend to every 
attribute. Lesser attention can be expected to increase the error variance in the model. 
4 Empirical Example 
4.1 A stated preference survey concerning morbidity/mortality risk 
reduction programs 
    As a simple illustration, we use choice data from a stated preference survey concerning 
individuals' preferences over health-risk reduction programs. Cameron and DeShazo (2008) use 
stated preference methods to elicit preferences for programs to reduce the risk of morbidity and 
mortality in a general-population sample of adults in the United States. In brief, the survey 
(administered by Knowledge Networks, Inc.) consists of five modules. The first module asks 
respondents, among a variety of other questions, to rate their subjective risks, from low (-2) to 
high (+2), of contracting each of a range of major illnesses or injuries. 
    The second module is a tutorial that explains the concept of an "illness profile." This is a 
description of a sequence of future health states associated with a specified major illness or 
injury that the respondent may face over his or her remaining lifetime. An illness profile includes 
the years before the individual becomes sick (latency), illness-years while the individual is sick, 
recovered/post-illness-years after the individual more-or-less recovers from the illness, and lost 
life-years if the individual dies earlier than he would have in the absence of the illness or injury. 
After the tutorial about illness profiles, the individual is informed that he might be able to 
purchase new programs that would reduce his risk of experiencing certain illness profiles. Each 
illness-related risk-reduction program described in the survey consists of diagnostic blood tests, 
drug therapies, and life-style changes, and would be available at a specified annual cost, to be 
paid on a recurring basis as long as the individual is neither sick with this illness nor dead. 
    The key module of each survey involves a set of five different three-alternative conjoint 
choice experiments where the individual is asked to choose one of two possible health-risk 
reducing programs or a status quo alternative. Each program reduces the individual's risk of 
experiencing the corresponding illness profile. The illness profiles are described succinctly for 
each of the choice tasks---in terms of the baseline probability, age at onset, duration, and 
eventual outcome (recovery or death). Each corresponding risk reduction program is defined in 
terms of the extent to which it can be expected to reduce this risk, and its monthly and annual 
cost. Figure 1 provides one instance of the type of a stated choice scenario posed to respondents. 
    Module 4 contains debriefing questions to cross-check the internal consistency of responses. 
Module 5 is collected separately from our survey and contains detailed socio-demographic data 
for the individual and their household, as well as responses to a battery of health-related 
questions (including any illnesses the individual has already faced). 
    Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the empirical models to be used in this paper. It 
summarizes only those variables pertinent to the present illustration. These include raw data, but 
this information is processed before use, based on the economic theory of discounted expected 
utility, to yield the necessary constructed variables for our analysis to be discussed below. 
Finally, in some of our specifications, we allow for preferences to differ systematically with 
exogenous characteristics of the respondent (gender and age). We also allow preferences to differ 
according to the individual's subjective risk rating for the illness/injury in question, with the 
average of their subjective risk ratings for all of the other major risk categories covered by our 
survey, and with any individual subjective adjustments of the surveys' statements about the 
existence of likely benefits and the latency of the health risk. 
4.2 Estimating specification for the naïve choice model 
    We will use a simplified version of the theoretical model presented by Cameron and DeShazo 
(2008). In that paper, it is established that stated choices in this general population sample appear 
to be best predicted by a model that involves discounted expected utility from durations in 
different adverse future health states. To understand the basic model, consider just a pair-wise 
choice between Program A and the status-quo alternative (N). Define the discount rate as r and 
let  1 tt r   . For individual i, let NSi be the probability of suffering a given adverse health 
profile (i.e. getting "sick") if the status-quo alternative is selected, and let ASi be the (reduced) 
probability of suffering this adverse health profile if Program A is chosen. Thus 
AS NS AS
i i i     is negative, since this is the risk reduction to be achieved by Program A. 
    The sequence of health states that makes up the illness profile to be addressed by Program A is 
captured by a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive (0,1) indicator variables associated with 
each future time period, iT :  1 - Aitpre illness  for pre-illness years,  1 Aitillness for illness-years, 
 1 Aitrecovered  for recovered, remissions, or post-illness years, and  1 -  Aitlife year lost for a year 
of premature mortality. Individuals are modeled as expecting to pay the annual cost of the risk 
reduction program only if they are neither sick nor dead. 
    The algebra of calculating present discounted expected utility differences is simplified 
considerably because we model health states as being uniform within specified intervals, as are 
income and program costs in this model. This feature allows us to discount health states first, and 
then take expectations. The present discounted number of years making up the remainder of the 
individual's nominal life expectancy, iT , is given by 1
iT t
i t
pdvc  . Other relevant discounted 
spells, also summed from t=1 to iT  include:  1 -A t Ait itpdve pre illness , 
 1A t Ait itpdvi illness ,  1A t Ait itpdvr recovered , and  1 -  A t Ait itpdvl life year lost .  
Since the different health states exhaust the individual's nominal life expectancy, 
A A A A
i i i i ipdve pdvi pdvr pdvl pdvc    . Finally, to accommodate the assumption that each 
individual expects to pay program costs only during the pre-illness or recovered post-illness 
periods, A A Ai i ipdvp pdve pdvr   is defined as the present discounted (healthy) time over which 
payments must be made. This can be interpreted as the expected discounted duration of program 
costs, with the expectation taken across whether or not the individual gets sick. 
    To further simplify notation, let  1A AS AS Ai i i i icterm pdvc pdvp      and let 
 1A NS NS A AS Ai i i i i i iyterm pdvc pdvp pdvi      . These two terms account for the pattern 
of income net of program costs over time as a function of probabilistic health states. Then the 
expected utility-difference that drives the individual's choice between Program A and the status 
quo can be defined as follows (where there will be an analogous term for the utility difference 
between Program B and the status quo in our three-alternative model): 
(17) 
    
     
1
2 3 4                          
A A A A
i i i i i i
A A A A A A A
i i i i i i i
PDV E V Y c cterm Y yterm
pdvi pdvr pdvl

   
     
      
 
The four terms in braces can be constructed from the data, given specific assumptions about the 
discount rate.14 In this application, these constructed variables are the x_{ki} (the differences in 
the attribute levels between each substantive alternative and the status quo). 
    The empirical results described in Cameron and DeShazo (2008) suggest that a basic four-
parameter, homogeneous-preferences model such as that in equation (<ref>DeltaE</ref>) is 
dominated by a specification that is not merely linear in the terms involving present discounted 
health-state years. Factoring the probability difference out of the final substantive term in 
equation  (17) gives: 
(18) 
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where j=A,B,N, and  the expression is zero for the N alternative because there is no risk 
reduction in that case. However, we find in our other work with these data that this simple linear 
specification does not explain respondents' observed choices as well as a model that employs 
shifted logarithms of the jipdvX : 
                                                 
14 In this paper, we assume a common discount rate of 5%. In Cameron and DeShazo (2006b), we explore the 
consequences of assuming either a 3% discount rate or a 7% discount rate. Work in progress involves the estimation 
of individual-specific discount rates simultaneously with these stated choices concerning health risk reduction 
programs, using additional data on intertemporal choices by a separate sample of respondents from the same 
population. 
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The basic expected discounted utility-difference specification that is presumed to drive 
respondent's choices is therefore: 
(20) 
    
  
  
  
1
2
3
4
                          log 1
                          log 1
                          log 1
                          
A A A A
i i i i i i
A A
i i
A A
i i
A A A
i i i
PDV E V Y c cterm Y yterm
pdvi
pdvr
pdvl



 
     
  
  
   
A A
i ix   
 
There is an analogous term for Program B in the three-way choice context. 
    In the empirical estimates that follow, our "basic linear" model involves these four constructed 
variables in the sets of braces in equation (20), and their four estimated parameters, 
 1 2 3 4, , ,    . We assume that a researcher who ignores the effects of scenario design 
(specifically, the mix of attribute levels presented in a choice set) would merely estimate this 
simple model. In Cameron and DeShazo (2008) we show how the estimated model can be used 
to build estimates of something called the value of a statistical illness profile (VSIP) which is 
analogous to the more-restrictive concept of the value of a statistical life (VSL) commonly 
employed in the mortality risk valuation literature. For this paper, however, we concentrate 
solely on the estimation of the four parameters in equation (20) and the extent to which attention 
to these four different attributes may be biased as a result of the design of our choice sets. 
4.3 Potential attention biases: measurement and control 
    To construct measures for the similarity of alternatives based on all attributes other than the 
one in question, it is necessary to have measures of the "true" marginal utilities of each attribute, 
uncontaminated by attention biases. To identify these true marginal utilities, however, it is 
necessary to control for attention biases. 
    Ideally, one would specify a conditional logit choice model where each additively separable 
marginal utility parameter is allowed to shift with variables which measure  ' ki kdissim x    and 
 ki kdissim x  , for each attribute. However, these dissimilarity variables will each be a fairly 
complicated function of the same basic vector of "true" marginal utility parameters that they 
modify. It is straightforward (if tedious) to write down the log-likelihood for full information 
maximum likelihood estimation of this model (using any of the practical candidates for these 
dissimilarity measures). However, given the complex manner in which the basic utility 
parameters enter the model, one can expect the log-likelihood function to be somewhat difficult 
to maximize. 
    To allow us to explore these data for evidence of unequal attention bias across attributes, 
however, it is possible to implement a crude correction without resorting to custom-programmed 
nonlinear optimization models. Estimation can be accomplished by employing an iterative 
algorithm that relies solely on packaged conditional logit algorithms. This iterative algorithm is 
described in detail in Appendix A (this seems to mimic the method used by Swait and 
Adamowicz (2001) in their work with entropy as a measure of choice set complexity). Upon 
convergence, the last set of parameters can be used to compute the "final" estimated values of the 
shift variables capturing, for each attribute, the similarity of the available alternatives based on 
the other attributes, and the dissimilarity of the available alternatives based on this attribute. In 
our model, there will be eight additional (estimated) regressors. 
    When the model is estimated iteratively in this fashion, using packaged conditional logit 
software, the parameter variance-covariance matrix in the last round, of course, does not reflect 
the estimated nature of the estimated other- and own-attribute standard deviations (or "leads") in 
utility. Full information maximum likelihood estimation is required to estimate all of the 
parameters of the two models simultaneously, so that a full parameter variance-covariance 
matrix can be obtained.15 
4.4 Empirical results 
    In this example, we expect to find a positive marginal utility of income  1 , and negative 
marginal utilities associated with the logarithms of (shifted) present discounted sick-years, 
recovered-years, and lost life-years  2 3 4, ,   . We expect that the greater the disparity in 
utilities across alternatives, based on other attributes, the less will be the individual's apparent 
responsiveness to differences in the level of any given attribute. We also expect that the greater 
the difference in utility derived from the attribute in question, the greater will be the individual's 
apparent responsiveness to differences in the level of any given attribute. 
4.4.1 Models using   ' ki ksd x    and   ki ksd x  : 
    Table 2 shows the results of a succession of fixed-effects conditional logit-type models where 
the disparities in indirect utility based on all other attributes, and based on just this attribute, are 
measured as the standard deviation across alternatives. Model SD1 (homogeneous preferences) is 
a baseline specification, with no attention-related correction terms, involving only the four utility 
parameters in our most basic specification. The signs on all three estimated parameters are as 
anticipated, and each is strongly statistically significantly different from zero. 
                                                 
15 We have explored a number of FIML specifications for the overall optimization process, using Matlab's general 
function-optimizing software. As would be expected, however, it can be very difficult to achieve convergence in this 
context because the various utility parameters in the model enter multiplicatively.  One can expect the iterative 
estimates used in the body of this paper to understate the amount of noise in the estimates, to a degree, because the 
dissimilarity variables are treated as nonstochastic when they are actually estimated quantities. 
    Model SD2 (heterogeneous preferences) generalizes this specification to allow for 
systematically varying preference parameters. The marginal utility of net income is statistically 
significantly higher for women. The coefficient capturing the marginal disutility of expected 
discounted sick-years is negative. It is more negative, the higher the individual's subjective risk 
of suffering the illness or injury targeted by the risk-reduction program in question. It is less 
negative, the higher the individual's average subjective risk of suffering from any of the other 
major categories of health risks addressed in the survey. If the individual indicates, ex post, that 
they expect never to benefit from the program in question, the disutility from illness in this case 
is drastically reduced. Finally, the greater the individual's overestimate of the latency period 
before benefits begin (i.e. before the illness or injury will cause pain or disability), the lesser the 
implied disutility from present discounted sick-time. 
    If recovered-years are viewed as a return to perfect health, we would expect utility in that state 
should be identical to pre-illness utility, but our estimates suggest that most individuals do not 
view this to be the case. There appears to be negative utility associated with "recovered" years, 
and this disutility is greater, the older the respondent at the time when these stated choices are 
being made. 
    Lost life-years confer negative utility, and moreso the greater the individual's subjective risk 
of the illness or injury in question. Again, the higher the average subjective risk rating for the 
other major illnesses in the survey, the lesser the disutility from lost life-years due to the cause in 
question. If the individual expects never to benefit, disutility is far less, and the greater the extent 
to which latency is overestimated, the lesser the disutility from lost life-years from a given cause. 
All of the systematic heterogeneity we identify is thus plausible. 
    Model SD3 uses a specification analogous to Model SD1 to calculate both the (latent) utility 
differences based on all other attributes and the utility differences based only on the attribute in 
question. We use 30 iterations of the model, by which point the permutation vector essentially 
disappears. In this specification, however, the systematic variation in marginal utilities with 
respect to the two factors which the theory suggests should drive the relative attention to 
different attributes is not fully consistent with our theory. Only three of the key eight parameters 
bear the expected sign, and of these, only one is statistically significantly different from zero. 
Two are statistically significant but bear the incorrect sign. 
    We suspect that these disconcerting results stem from our assumption of homogeneous 
preferences in Model SD3. If everyone shares the same set of four utility parameters, then there 
will no variation across individuals in the utility derived from any one level of a given attribute 
or from any one set of levels for the rest of the attributes. So we allow for heterogeneous 
preferences. We use an analogy to Model SD2 in our iterative estimation process, with the 
results displayed as Model SD4. Again the results are disappointing, based on what we expect 
from our theory. Only two of the eight key parameters are statistically significant and both of 
these bear the "wrong" sign. 
    However, we explore one additional specification, Model SD5. In this case, we suppose that 
the researcher adheres to the simple four-parameter specification used in Model SD1. 
Specifications such as this one--linear and additively separable in the list of attributes--are 
widely used in the choice literature. However, we use the richer, heterogeneous-preferences 
specification of Model SD2 to calculate the special variables used to control for the similarity of 
alternatives based on all utility implied by other attributes, as well as for the dissimilarity of 
alternatives based only on the utility implied by the attribute currently in question. In this case, 
the predictions of our theoretical model jump into sharp relief. All four basic utility parameters in 
the model bear the anticipated signs, and all eight of the key attention-related shift parameters 
also bear the anticipated signs. Futhermore, the pairs of shifters for the sick-years and lost life-
years variables are all strongly statistically significant (at the 1% level). 
    Model SD5 appears to tell a cautionary tale. Parameter estimates from the simple four-
parameter homogeneous-preferences ("naive") specification in Model SD1 have the potential to 
be substantially biased by neglect of our two types of attention factors. By how much? The 
standard deviations which we use to measure the attention factors are normalized on their mean 
values in the sample, so that each baseline coefficient in Model SD5 corresponds to a case where 
the similarity of alternatives based on other attributes, and their dissimilarity based on the current 
attribute, are equal to their sample mean values across all respondents. Presumably, the baseline 
parameters at the means of the sample are approximately what we measure in Model SD1. Our 
results suggest that the combination of other-attribute dissimilarity and own-attribute 
dissimilarity influence respondent attention and result in a tendency for the researcher to 
overestimate the marginal utility derived from net income, overestimate the marginal disutility of 
sick-years and lost-life-years, and perhaps to underestimate the marginal disutility of recovered-
years, on average. 
    The main insight from Model SD5 is that our usual models assume that the mix of attribute 
levels across alternatives should have no systematic effect on marginal utilities. The evidence in 
Model SD5 suggests that our theoretical insights may be supported in these data, although it may 
be necessary to ensure a reasonable degree if individual-specific variation in preferences to 
capture the extent to which a set of alternatives may be judged (by each different individual) to 
be more or less similar based on their other attributes. Our example also suggests that, under a 
model with sufficient heterogeneity in preferences, these biases may be avoided, but we find 
evidence of their presence in a too-simple homogeneous-preferences specification. 
    The bottom panel of Table 2 summarizes the sizes of the distortions which may be due to 
respondents' attention to attributes having potentially been steered by the design of the choice 
set. Adverse health states are "bads," so the marginal utility of an additional "log discounted 
year" in any adverse health state can be assumed to be negative (i.e. it is a disutility). We convert 
each of our estimated marginal utilities to a marginal willingness to pay by dividing through by 
the marginal utility of net income. At the bottom of Table 2, based on 21111 draws from the joint 
normal distribution of the estimated parameters, we report the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of 
the distribution of the ratio of these marginal utilities. Since the results for sick-years and lost 
life-years are the most robust, we report on the distributions of marginal WTP for roughly a one 
percent change in discounted sick-years and a one percent change in discounted lost life-years. If 
we assme that negative WTP for a worse health state is symmetric with the positive WTP for 
similar improvement i health status, then the simple four-parameter homogeneous preferences 
Model SD1 yields a median estimate of $8.6 for this change in sick-years, whereas Model SD5 
suggests that this marginal WTP is more like $13.35. For the life-years variable, Model SD1 
suggests a median estimate of $9.48, whereas Model SD5 implies a marginal WTP of only 
$4.62. Differences of this size are likely to be relevant to policy-making. 
4.4.2 Models using   ' ki klead x    and   ki klead x  : 
    The last column of Table 2 displays results for a model analogous to Model SD5 where the 
apparent marginal utility from each attribute is allowed to shift systematically with (1) the extent 
to which there is a "clear winner" among the three alternatives based on the other attributes; and 
(2) the extent to which there is a "clear winner" among the three alternatives based on the 
contribution made to utility by this attribute. This final column records that all coefficients in 
Model Lead5 have the anticipated signs, and furthermore, that the four key shift coefficients for 
sick-years and lost life-years are strongly statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. In these specifications, however, neither of the attention-related shifters for the income 
term is statistically significant (although each bears the anticipated sign). 
    In terms of the extent of the bias in the four parameters of the simple specification due to 
failure to account for deviations from the average across the three alternatives in the two 
measures of utility similarity and dissimilarity (based on other attributes and on the attribute in 
question), model Lead5 also suggests that the marginal utility of income may be overestimated in 
the naïve homogeneous-preferences model. The disutility from sick-years and lost life-years may 
be overestimated rather substantially, and the disutility from recovered years may be 
underestimated. Implications for the two main marginal WTP estimates in the model are again 
described in the bottom panel of the table.16 
4.4.3 Other models 
    In this research, we have also explored a specification using  ' ki kskew x    and  ki kskew x   
and we have investigated models which use both standard deviation and skewness measures at 
the same time. Finally, we have examined specifications in terms of entropy measures. These 
other specifications appear to be less appropriate for the data used in our example, although they 
may be useful in other empirical applications. 
    It is reasonable to ask whether the distortions due to the mix of own- and other-attribute levels 
could be avoided by resorting to mixed logit models or models where the logit parameters are all 
                                                 
16 Respondents were given no opportunity to express negative WTP for any of the health-risk reduction programs in 
the survey, so we tend to interpret point estimates which imply negative WTP for improvements as merely zero 
WTP. 
random (and either uncorrelated or correlated). Recognition of some type of heterogeneity is 
usually preferable to ignoring heterogeneity altogether. We have estimated the specification 
reported as Model SD5 in Table 2, but with the four baseline coefficients in the naive model 
implemented as normally distributed random parameters. All four standard deviations for these 
random parameters are strongly statistically significantly different from zero. The expected 
values of the random parameters remain the same order of magnitude as the fixed coefficients in 
Model SD5, although the α₂ and α₃ coefficients remain significant only at the 10% level. 
However, our findings for the eight key shifters (four each for other-attribute dissimilarity and 
own-attribute dissimilarly) remain the same. All coefficients are strongly significant and bear the 
theoretically expected signs (except for the two shifters for the recovered-years term, which are 
also statistically insignificant in Model SD5). 
4.4.4 Effects on apparent marginal utilities: 
    Our finding that own-attribute and other-attribute dissimilarity measures can have a strongly 
statistically significant effect upon the estimated marginal utilities in discrete choice models is 
notable. Standard random utility models assume these effects are zero, so that the apparent 
marginal utilities from a discrete choice model are interpreted as being identical to the true 
underlying marginal utilities. We argue here, however, that these apparent marginal utilities are 
likely to represent a combination of true marginal utilities and attention to each attribute. Thus, it 
is also important to evaluate the potential effect of these drivers of systematic differences in 
attention on the resulting estimates of willingness to pay. In our illustrative example, we know 
from other work with these data that a simple linear-in-logs specification is too simple, so we 
will avoid calculating and advertising estimates of willingness to pay for health risk reductions 
that we know to be incorrect. However, we note that many researchers using discrete choice 
models tend to begin with simple linear models such as the one we entertain for our example. We 
thus calculate the likely scope of the systematic effects of our new dissimilarity variables on the 
implied estimates of WTP by examining their effects on the implied marginal utilities of each 
attribute. 
    Table 3 begins by displaying, in its first row, the baseline point estimates of marginal utility 
associated with each (constructed) attribute in our model. These are the "levelized" marginal 
utilities, for our model SD5, which apply in the counterfactual instance where all four other-
attribute utility-difference variables (and all four own-attribute utility-difference variables) are 
set equal to their sample means. These can be compared to our uncorrected naive model SD1, 
where homogeneous preferences are assumed. Whereas the marginal (dis)utility of a present 
discounted adverse health-state year ranged roughly between -24 and -29 for the three health 
states in the naive model, the levelized marginal utilities are considerably different. 
    The most important insight, however, may be gleaned from the rest of Table 3. Holding the 
own-attribute dissimilarity measure at its sample mean value, we first calculate and display the 
range of fitted values across selected percentiles of the sampling distribution of calculated other-
attribute dissimilarity levels (based on the heterogeneous-preferences specification of Model 
SD5). The marginal utility of income parameter can be seen to differ by a factor of ten between 
the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of other-attribute dissimilarity. Since this marginal 
utility enters into the denominator of WTP calculations, this implies a corresponding possible 
ten-fold difference in WTP estimates! If we instead hold constant the sample mean the other-
attribute dissimilarity measure, we find that own-attribute utility differences can contribute to a 
2.5-fold difference in the marginal utility of income parameter. 
    With respect to the other marginal utilities in the basic model, there is further evidence of 
heterogeneity. Since the means and medians differ, there is certainly some skewness in the 
estimated heterogeneous values. The presence of cross-overs in the signs of the estimated 
marginal utilities within the range of the data suggest that non-linear models may be desirable, 
since they could constrain the disutilities of adverse health states to be strictly negative. For this 
illustration, however, we seek merely to demonstrate that our two dissimilarity variables are 
potentially important shifters of the fitted values of the apparent marginal utility parameters in 
such a model. 
4.5 Caveats 
    Subjects in our study each have the opportunity to make five different choices. In this case, it 
may not be the standard deviation across the current choice set in utility contributions for a 
particular attribute which determines attention to that attribute. Instead, it may be the standard 
deviation in utility contributions across both the current and all previous choice sets that 
determines the attention devoted to an attribute. We do not pursue this possibility here. 
    To allow the baseline marginal utility parameters to be comparable across our various 
specifications, we first normalize our dissimilarity variables on their mean values across all 
respondents. This permits us to consider the case where all dissimilarity variables might match 
the sample-wide mean as equivalent to the case where the shift variables we actually use are all 
simultaneously zero. We have not addressed the possibility that one might normalize on the 
within-individual means, but to allow these mean dissimilarity measures to differ across 
individuals. An a priori sense of the promise of such a strategy is harder to come by, since the 
relevant quantities are factors in interaction terms, rather than basic variables in the model. 
    One might argue that our use of the richer heterogeneous-preferences model to generate our 
eight fitted dissimilarity measures is merely an alternative strategy for bringing respondent 
heterogeneity into the naive homogeneous preferences model. This criticism may be supported 
by the fact that the same dissimilarity measures make no real difference when they are added to 
the heterogenous-preferences model. But this does not take away from the intriguing finding that 
respondent heterogeneity--exclusively via its influence on the two types of theoretically 
motivated measures of alternative similarity--contributes so very much to explaining differences 
in apparent marginal utilities in the naive model (which is where many practical conjoint choice 
analyses begin and end).17 
5 Conclusions and Potential Implications 
    In conventional random utility choice models, researchers usually assume complete and 
costless information. However, subjects' cognitive resources are typically scarce. Individuals 
presumably must compare the marginal benefits and marginal costs of attention to different 
dimensions of a choice task, and optimize their allocation of attention. In this paper, we focus on 
the individual's allocation of his or her attention across the different attributes which can be used 
to describe each alternative in a choice set. Inattention to differences in the levels of a particular 
attribute may masquerade empirically as a lower marginal utility associated with that attribute. 
Marginal utilities from choice models are the key ingredients in the calculation of willingness-to-
pay in many applications. Distortions in these marginal utilities can lead to distortions in the 
sorts of willingness-to-pay estimates which are critical to an understanding of demands for the 
goods in question. 
                                                 
17 One can in principle impose sign restrictions by assuming, for example, a log-normal rather than normal 
distribution for each parameters (using the negative of the variable in estimation if a strictly negative coefficient is 
desired). For this application, however, models with such restrictions failed to converge. 
    Our illustrative empirical example represents a first partial attempt to implement an attention-
corrected choice model with a sample of "field" data from a conjoint choice experiment in a 
large stated preference survey. When we use a four-parameter homogeneous-preferences model 
to build the two dissimilarity measures associated with each attribute, and use these two 
measures to shift each marginal utility in what is otherwise the same four-parameter 
homogeneous model, we find no evidence of the effects predicted by our theory. We then 
generalize our model to make each of our four marginal utilities a systematically varying 
parameter, allowing for heterogeneity in preferences. If these heterogeneous preferences are used 
to build the two dissimilarity measures associated with each attribute, and these measures are the 
used to shift each of the four marginal utilities in the same heterogeneous-preferences model, 
they likewise fail to produce the effect predicted by our theory. 
    However, we subsequently assume heterogeneous preferences in the process of constructing 
the dissimilarity measures, so that our pairs of dissimilarity measures associated with each 
attribute differ across individuals because their preferences are different. Using these 
heterogeneous dissimilarity measures as estimates of "latent" variables that have the capability to 
shift the four basic marginal utilities in a homogeneous-preferences model produces highly 
significant results fully consistent with our theory. Choice modelers do often explore 
homogeneous-preferences specifications, seeking to estimate preferences for a representative 
consumer. Our results certainly suggest that such "representative preferences" may be biased by 
heterogeneity in perceived dissimilarities. 
    Our theoretical and empirical explorations of criteria that may affect respondents' optimal 
allocation of attention to attributes have some implications for other regularities which have been 
observed in different types of choice behavior: 
    SP too different from RP choice sets.—Choice  set designs used for stated preference 
surveys may tend to produce uneven attention to different attributes. This might be of little 
consequence if the corresponding real choice contexts were assured of being similar. However, if 
the conditions surrounding the choice are sufficiently different in the context wherein a choice 
prediction is desired---so that the marginal benefits and/or marginal costs of attention to 
attributes are different---a model calibrated under an implicit assumption of complete attention 
(when this is not so) may produce misleading forecasts of future choices. 
    Consequentiality.—In  purely hypothetical stated preference choice contexts, where stated 
choices may be viewed as inconsequential, the marginal benefits from attention to all attributes 
could be perceived to be very low (see Carson et al., 2003; 2004). In contrast, the marginal costs 
of attention to any additional attribute may be very similar to those in a real choice context. A 
lack of perceived consequentiality would thus be predicted to lead to a lower overall optimal 
level of attention being paid to the choice task. If attention to each attribute is reduced 
proportionally, we have argued that the only substantive effect may be an increase in the error 
dispersion, relative to the full attention case, with no resulting bias in the relative sizes of the 
estimated marginal utility parameters, and thus no distortion in any resulting estimates of the 
expected WTP. However, levels of attention to different attributes may not be scaled down 
uniformly across all attributes when less-than-complete attention is optimal. Our theory focuses 
on the marginal benefits part of the story, and suggests that the marginal benefits from attention 
to an additional attribute depend in a fairly complex fashion upon the pattern of attributes in the 
choice set and on the individual's marginal utilities from each attribute. Simply the design of a 
choice set can steer the subject's attention toward some attributes and away from others. 
    Price listed last.—In  SP experiments, the utility loss from making a wrong choice can be 
negligible, since the individual may believe that he or she will not have to live with the 
consequences of an "incorrect" choice---in particular, the knowledge that they have paid good 
money for something that turned out to be not exactly what they wanted or expected. If 
respondents do not fully take into account the fact that they would actually have to pay the cost 
of the preferred alternative, they may pay less attention than they should to differences in costs 
(especially if these costs are listed at the bottom of the conjoint choice table). If order effects 
increase the relative cost of attention to the cost attribute, and attention is steered toward other 
attributes by listing them first, it may be unsurprising that the propensity to attend to other 
attributes will be greater than the propensity to attend to cost. The marginal utility of income 
may be underestimated by more than the marginal utilities of the other attributes. The predicted 
result would be an upward bias in WTP, since the marginal utility of income forms the 
denominator in WTP calculations. 
    Cheap talk scripts.—In  SP surveys, since the publication of Cummings and Taylor (1999), 
researchers have been encouraged to employ a so-called "cheap talk" script wherein subjects are 
reminded to consider their budget constraint carefully before stating their preferred option. 
Often, this section of the survey will draw special attention to the cost attribute, immediately 
prior to the choice task. In a conjoint choice context, this effort can be expected to increase 
attention to the cost attribute without treating the other attributes symmetrically. Our theory 
suggests that this can be expected to lead to a larger-than-otherwise estimated marginal utility of 
income and perhaps smaller-than-otherwise estimated marginal utilities for other attributes (if 
scarce attention is reallocated), which will tend to "bias," rather than "correct" the resulting WTP 
estimates. However, if a lack of consequentiality for the entire choice exercise has already 
produced lower attention to the cost attribute, the cheap talk effort may be warranted. However, 
our results strongly suggest that any attempt to direct the subject's attention should be examined 
carefully. We certainly know that the cost attribute is frequently downplayed in RP contexts: 
restaurant menus list the price of the entree last, advertisements encourage prospective customers 
to "contact the dealer for price information". Effort is often made to divert attention from other 
attributes as well, expecially where they may convey negative marginal utilities: some less 
desirable attributes of goods for sale are listed in the fine print (e.g. pharmaceutical side effects), 
    SP attributes sometimes "too orthogonal."—To  maximize estimation efficiency for 
marginal utilities associated with a whole range of attributes, the joint distribution of attributes in 
stated preference studies often has greater orthogonality or greater variance than might be 
present in the corresponding real-world choice context. As Jordan Louviere has pointed out, 
"Realism is not a design property" for a choice set. Our theoretical results suggest that the degree 
of orthogonality in attributes may have a systematic effect on the sizes of naively estimated 
marginal utilities. In the corresponding real choice context, subjects may face alternatives where 
the differences in many attributes across alternative may be much smaller than they had been in 
the stated-preference estimating sample. This lesser difference changes the expected net benefits 
from considering the different attributes and changes the extent to which the individual is likely 
to take into account each of these attributes in the real-choice context. A choice model estimated 
on stated preferences would incorrectly predict choices under the choice regime in a subsequent 
revealed preference setting. 
    More "ceteris paribus" than in real choices.—While  attribute levels may be more different 
in some SP studies than they are in real life, in other cases the researcher's goal is merely to 
obtain a precise estimate of just one marginal utility. In this situation, the choice sets might 
consist of alternatives where all other attributes are held constant and only the attribute of 
interest is varied across alternatives. In some cases, the choice scenario may not even list other 
important attributes and will simply ask respondents to assume that all other features of the 
alternatives are identical. Our theory suggests that the greater the number of attributes held 
constant across alternatives, the larger will be the apparent marginal utilities associated with the 
attributes which do vary.18 
    Marginal cost differences.—Our  theory does not explicitly derive the factors which should 
determine the marginal cost of attention to an additional attribute. However, intuition suggests 
that the marginal costs of attention to different attributes may also differ. A variety of conditions 
could affect the marginal cost of attention to an incremental attributes. One is the accessibility of 
the information about each attribute (e.g. its position in the order of attributes in a conjoint 
choice scenario). For a decision-maker faced by different levels of distraction or time pressure in 
making a choice, the fact that the marginal cost of attention is likely increasing in the number of 
attributes in a choice set will also be relevant. Some attributes, such as risk for example, may be 
more difficult to understand for some types of subjects. This suggests that there will likely be 
differences in the marginal propensity to attend to each attribute whenever cognitive constraints 
are binding. Differences in attention can lead to biases in estimated marginal utilities and thereby 
to distortions in estimated WTP. 
    Overall, we have derived from optimizing behavior some results that seem to match closely 
with casual empiricism about choice behavior. People are motivated to pay attention to 
additional attributes in a choice exercise to the extent that this behavior will reduce their 
                                                 
18 For example, had the identical resumes with different names been sent to the same prospective employers in the 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) study, one might expect that race, as implied by the different names, might have 
been found to have an exaggerated influence on choices compared to a choice context where the resumes differed in 
many other dimensions as well. 
expected lost utility from making an incorrect choice. They pay more attention to any given 
attribute if the alternatives look more similar in terms of utility based on the other attributes 
under consideration. They also pay more attention to an attribute if the utility derived from that 
attribute differs greatly across alternatives. These are simple insights. In our empirical adaptation 
of this theory, we encounter some difficulty in estimating an appropriate specification using full 
information maximum likelihood methods because the same utility parameters appear in so many 
places in the log-likelihood. Nevertheless, we have implemented the estimation in an alternating 
sequence of steps that appears to lead to stable converged parameter estimates. We demonstrate 
that the apparent marginal utilities from different attributes can vary dramatically with the mix of 
attribute levels presented across all alternatives, and thus so can the implied WTP. This is more 
evidence that, by manipulating the mix of attribute levels in a choice set, it may be possible to 
"steer" respondent attention (inadvertently or strategically) to either exaggerate or downplay 
apparent marginal utilities and hence the resulting average WTP (benefits estimates). 
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Appendix 1: Alternating Estimation Algorithm 
 
    Step 0: Estimate the model without any attention corrections. Save these temporary estimates 
of the k=1,...,K marginal utility parameters. These might be scalars,  '0 01ˆ ˆ,..., K  , or 
systematically varying parameters,  '0 ' 0 '1 1ˆ ˆ,...,i K KiZ Z  , each depending on a subvector of 
parameters 0ˆk  and a vector kiZ of individual characteristics. 
    Step 1: Based on these initial estimates of the four marginal utilities, construct the contribution 
to net indirect utility associated with each attribute, relative to that for the numeraire alternative, 
J. This may be a single scalar marginal utility times its associated attribute level, ˆjki kx  ,or it may 
be a systematically varying marginal utility times the associated attribute level,  'ˆjki k kix Z , for 
k=1,...,K. Sum these contributions across all attributes to calculate ' ˆjix  , the net indirect utility 
index associated with each alternative, j=1,...,J-1. For the numeraire alternative, this net utility 
will be zero. 
    a.) For each attribute, subtract from total systematic utility the contribution made by just that 
attribute to leave the model's prediction about net indirect utility based only on the other 
attributes in the model, ˆjki kx    (or  'ˆjki k kix Z    in the systematically varying parameter case). 
Construct a measure of the dissimilarity of the alternatives on the basis of these other attributes, 
 0ˆki kdissim x   , or   0'ˆki k kidissim x Z   . We have suggested several candidates: the size of the 
lead, in utility units, the standard deviation across alternatives in these other-attribute utility 
level, and the skewness in these measures across alternatives. Adjust the location of these 
measures by using their deviations from the overall sample mean values (or any other target 
value to be simulated by zeroing out this dissimilarity measure): 
                               0 0 0ˆ ˆ ˆ_ _ki k ki k ki kd dissim x dissim x mean dissim x         . 
    b.) For each attribute, construct a measure of the dissimilarity of the three alternatives on the 
basis of just this attribute:  0ˆki kdissim x   or   0'ˆki k kidissim x Z . Again, possible candidates 
include the lead of the highest utility contribution due to this attribute, over the second-highest 
across alternatives, or the standard deviation, or the skewness in these utility-contributions across 
alternatives. Again, adjust these measures by using their deviations from the overall sample 
mean values (or some other target value to be simulated when the deviations are all zero), to 
yield  0ˆ_ ki kd dissim x  . 
    Step 2: Re-estimate the model, but now allow the marginal utility from each attribute (or the 
intercept of the marginal utility expression, if it is modeled as a systematically varying 
parameter) to vary systematically with the calculated dissimilarity of the alternatives in this 
choice set based on net utility from other attributes, as well as the dissimilarity of the alternatives 
based on net utility only from this attribute. Each "observed" marginal utility parameter is now 
modeled as also varying systematically with  0ˆki kdissim x    and  0ˆki kdissim x  . In this second 
iteration, the new vector of "true (corrected)" underlying marginal utility parameters for each 
attribute, 1ˆk , is supplemented by the estimated coefficients on each of these two dissimilarity 
terms, yielding  1 1 1ˆ ˆˆ, ,k k k    for k=1,...,K. If the marginal utilities in the model are scalars, this 
generalization will triple the number of estimated parameters. If the marginal utilities are 
systematic varying parameters, the number of estimated parameters will increase by 2K. 
    Step 3: Net out the estimated biases in systematic utility due to  0ˆ_ ki kd dissim x    and 
 0ˆ_ ki kd dissim x   by setting these 2K different constructed variables to zero. This simulates the 
case where, for all attributes, the dissimilarity of alternatives based on all other attributes, and 
based on each specific attribute, is the same for all attributes in all choice sets. We then interpret 
the other utility parameters in the model as the "true" utility parameters (corrected for attention 
biases created (unintentionally?) by the mix of attributes designed into the choice set). 
    Step 4: Repeat Step 1, now using these updated estimates of the basic utility parameters, 
 '1 11ˆ ˆ,..., K  , or systematically varying parameters,  '1' 1'1 1ˆ ˆ,...,i K KiZ Z  , as the "true" utility 
parameters to construct updated measures of dissimilarity,  1ˆ_ ki kd dissim x    and 
 1ˆ_ ki kd dissim x  . Continue to iterate through Step 1 through 3 until the length of the step-to-step 
permutation in the parameter vector becomes arbitrarily small. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2: Corrected Variance-Covariance Matrix 
    We have also estimated Models SD1 through SD5 as conditional logit-type specifications 
without fixed effects. A fixed effects specification is less crucial in this context because the 
attributes of the alternatives in our choice sets were randomized, subject only to exclusions for 
implausibility. Results of a similar flavor emerge, with the analog to Model SD5 again providing 
evidence of the types of attention-diverting effects suggested by our theory. These non-fixed-
effects models also allow us to address the problem that the standard errors at the last iteration of 
the steps in the estimation algorithm do not reflect the fact that the variables used for the eight 
dissimilarity terms are calculated based on the last round of point estimates from the 
heterogeneous specification (which also involves fitted dissimilarity variables from the most 
recent round of estimates). 
    Ideally, one would estimate all parameters of the model simultaneously by full information 
maximum likelihood. However, since the basic utility parameters appear in so many different 
places in these models, we are not surprised to find that such likelihood function is very difficult 
to optimize by standard methods. Using the alternating algorithm, convergence seems to be 
straightforward and unambiguous. When the converged point estimates from the alternating 
algorithm are inserted into the full likelihood function for the same problem and numerical 
derivatives are calculated for the full set of parameters, there is some shrinkage of the asymptotic 
t-test statistics on most parameters, but everything that was statistically significant at better than 
the 10% level at the end of the alternating algorithm remains significant in terms of the full log-
likelihood function. However, we note one markedly larger t-test statistic for the very last 
parameter in the model. The standard step-sizes for numeric derivatives may be inappropriate for 
this parameter. This particular test statistic needs yet to be understood. 
Figure 1: An Example of a Choice Set Summary Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Choose the program that reduces the illness that you most want to 
avoid.  But think carefully about whether the costs are too high for 
you.  If both programs are too expensive, then choose Neither 
Program. 
 
If you choose “neither program”, remember that you could die early 
from a number of causes, including the ones described below. 
 Program A for Diabetes 
Program B 
for Heart Attack 
Symptoms/ 
Treatment 
Get sick when 77 years old 
6 weeks of hospitalization 
No surgery 
Moderate pain for 7 years 
 
Get sick when 67 years old 
No hospitalization 
No surgery 
Severe pain for a few hours 
 
Recovery/ 
Life expectancy 
Do not recover 
Die at 84 instead of 88 
 
Do not recover 
Die suddenly at 67 instead of 88 
 
Risk Reduction 
10% 
From 10 in 1,000 to 9 in 1,000 
 
10% 
From 40 in 1,000 to 36 in 1,000 
 
Costs to you 
$12 per month 
[ = $144 per year] 
 
$17 per month 
[ = $204 per year] 
 
Your choice 
 
Reduce my 
chance of  
diabetes 
 
Reduce my 
chance of 
heart attack 
 Neither 
Program 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Estimating Specifications 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Program attributes (14074 programs) 
- Raw illness/program attributes 
Cost Annual cost of program (paid when not sick or dead) 355.00 341.14 24 1680 
AS
i  Risk change (i.e. negative, a risk reduction) -0.0034 0.0017 -0.006 -0.001 
Latency Years until illness/injury begins 19.65 12.03 1 60 
Sick years Duration of illness/injury (years) 6.53 7.21 0 52 
Recovered years Numer of years in post-illness health state 1.62 4.62 0 55 
Lost life-years Number of life-years lost 10.87 10.32 0 55 
- Constructed variables      
(income term) Net income under each alternative -0.052747 0.048772 -0.2513 0.1083 
AS
i log(pdvi+1) Term in present discounted sick-years -0.003111 0.003006 -0.01710 0 
AS
i log(pdvr+1) Term in present discounted recovered-years -0.003374 0.003189 -0.01711 0 
AS
i log(pdvl+1) Term in present discounted lost life-years -0.000746 0.001841 -0.01648 0 
Sasubrsk  (mean = msasubrsk) Same-illness subjective risk rating (-2 = low, 2=high) -0.2593 1.2531 -2 2 
Cosubrsk  (mean = mcosubrsk) Average subjective risk rating (other major health risks) -0.2537 0.8670 -2 2 
(benefits never) =1 if expects never to benefit from this program 0.0759 0.2648 0 1 
(min overest latency) Minimum overestimate of the latency of the health risk -7.483 11.98 -58 29 
Respondent characteristics (1519 respondents) 
Income Annual income (dollars) 51048 33781 5000 150000 
Female  =1 if female 0.5135 0.5000 0 1 
age (mean = mage) Age in years at time of response 50.11 15.18 25 93 
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Table 2:  “Standard Deviation” Variant: Uncorrected and Attention-corrected Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit Models 
for Health-Risk Reduction Programs (with homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences) 
 
  (SD1) (SD2) (SD3) (SD4) (SD5) (Lead5) 
 Exp. 
sign 
Homogeneous 
preferences 
Heterogeneous 
preference 
Attention 
homogenous-
homogeneous 
Attention 
heterogeneous-
heterogeneous 
Attention 
heterogeneous-
homogeneous 
Attention 
heterogeneous-
homogeneous 
Income term ( 1 )        
(income term) [ + ] 3.148 2.941 2.759 3.455 1.514 2.685 
  (7.77)*** (5.16)*** (3.96)*** (5.89)*** (2.93)*** (5.82)*** 
   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ - ] - - 7.715 3.152 -1.505 -.4693 
    (2.86)*** (3.11)*** (1.78)* (0.74) 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ + ] - - 4.882 -3.507 2.361 1.545 
    (1.08) (1.92)* (1.89)* (1.38) 
   …*female  - 3.916 - 5.473 - - 
   (5.58)***  (5.30)***   
Sick-years term ( 2 )        
AS
i log(pdvi+1) [ - ] -27.06 -14.39 -23.61 -20.57 -7.124 -11.23 
  (4.50)*** (1.93)* (2.46)** (2.65)*** (1.02) (1.69)* 
   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ + ] - - -48.13 -21.01 91.18 63.95 
    (1.04) (1.05) (5.36)*** (4.24)*** 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ - ] - - -4.894 21.08 -106.1 -136.8 
    (0.04) (0.92) (6.48)*** (10.94)*** 
   ...*(sasubrsk-msasubrsk)  - -22.09 - -26.32 - - 
   (3.80)***  (4.32)***   
   ...*(cosubrsk-mcosubrsk)  - 27.44 - 31.64 - - 
   (3.20)***  (3.61)***   
   ...*(benefits never)  - 137.4 - 130 - - 
   (4.14)***  (3.82)***   
   ...*(min overest latency)  - 8.13 - 9.24 - - 
   (12.53)***  (11.88)***   
Recovered-years term ( 3 )        
AS
i log(pdvr+1) [ - ] -24.03 -40.55 -72.19 -43.81 -33.92 -45.3 
  (2.51)** (3.98)*** (3.69)*** (2.28)** (2.16)** (2.99)*** 
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   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ + ] -  -57.4 .3823 31.98 39.68 
    (0.51) (0.01) (1.49) (2.12)** 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ - ] -  122.3 13.45 56.41 32.27 
    (1.92)* (0.13) (0.68) (0.58) 
   ...*(age-mage)  - -1.305 - -1.348 - - 
   (1.95)*  (1.62)   
Lost life-years term ( 4 )        
AS
i log(pdvl+1) [ - ] -29.82 -21.26 -45.62 -21.59 -20.23 -7.846 
  (5.68)*** (3.23)*** (5.18)*** (3.14)*** (3.30)*** (1.33) 
   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ + ] - - 96.09 17.12 94.09 78.25 
    (1.83)* (0.80) (4.95)*** (4.62)*** 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ - ] - - 102.2 -10.95 -43.3 -116.5 
    (1.99)** (0.61) (3.78)*** (12.04)*** 
   ...*(sasubrsk-msasubrsk)  - -40.67 - -41.03 - - 
   (7.48)***  (7.07)***   
   ...*(cosubrsk-mcosubrsk)  - 30.53 - 30.45 - - 
   (3.84)***  (3.78)***   
   ...*(benefits never)  - 217.4 - 215.8 - - 
   (6.63)***  (6.42)***   
   ...*(min overest latency)  - 8.219 - 8.415 - - 
   (13.65)***  (12.54)***   
Observations  21111 21111 21111 21111 21111 21111 
Log L  -10992.674 -10326.046 -10976.589 -10316.015 -10915.004 -10771.54 
Iterations    30 30 30 30 
Marginal WTP for incr. in log(pdvi+1)        
5%  -11.72  -27.35  -13.02 -6.61 
50%  -8.6  -16.47  -13.35 -2.97 
95%  -5.73  -3.21  3.99 -.08 
Marginal WTP for incr. in log(pdvl+1)        
5%  -12.81  -15.24  -28.68 -8.03 
50%  -9.48  -8.59  -4.62 -4.18 
95%  -6.73  -10.84  -6.58 .73 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      
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Table 3:  “Standard Deviation” Variant: Uncorrected and Attention-corrected Non-Fixed-Effects Conditional Logit Models 
for Health-Risk Reduction Programs (with homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences) 
 
  (SD1) 
iterative 
(SD2)  
iterative 
(SD3)  
iterative 
(SD4)  
iterative 
(SD5)  
iterative 
(One-step eff.) 
FIML 
 Exp. 
sign 
Homogeneous 
preferences 
Heterogeneous 
preference 
Attention 
homogenous-
homogeneous 
Attention 
heterogeneous-
heterogeneous 
Attention 
heterogeneous-
homogeneous 
Attention 
heterogeneous-
homogeneous 
Income term ( 1 )        
(income term) [ + ] 3.364 3.72 4.769 3.222 2.475 2.475 
  (8.28)*** (6.66)*** (0.38) (3.37)*** (2.78)*** (  2.22)** 
   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ - ] - - 58.84 3.646 -2.227 -2.227 
    (2.05)** (3.16)*** (2.30)** ( -1.94)* 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ + ] - - 470.6 -3.995 2.256 2.256 
    (1.75)* (1.91)* (1.64) -1.03 
   …*female  - 3.253 - 4.952 - - 
   (5.00)***  (4.93)***   
Sick-years term ( 2 )        
AS
i log(pdvi+1) [ - ] -28.87 -17.8 -14.3 -17.77 -18.57 -18.57 
  (4.76)*** (2.37)** (0.78) (1.34) (1.59) (  -1.7)* 
   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ + ] -  -29.67 -22.4 109.9 109.9 
    (0.65) (1.00) (5.83)*** (  4.46)** 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ - ] -  -71.4 11.54 -121.1 -121.1 
    (0.37) (0.45) (6.47)*** ( -6.89)** 
   ...*(sasubrsk-msasubrsk)  - -22.49 - -26.18 - - 
   (3.83)***  (4.27)***   
   ...*(cosubrsk-mcosubrsk)  - 29.68 - 33.21 - - 
   (3.47)***  (3.80)***   
   ...*(benefits never)  - 126.4 - 122.3 - - 
   (3.86)***  (3.65)***   
   ...*(min overest latency)  - 7.614 - 8.456 - - 
   (11.85)***  (11.36)***   
Recovered-years term ( 3 )        
AS
i log(pdvr+1) [ - ] -24.29 -40.35 -76.69 -30.9 -34.08 -34.08 
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  (2.53)** (3.92)*** (2.79)*** (1.23) (1.78)* ( -1.57) 
   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ + ] - - -19.88 -14.13 23.73 23.73 
    (0.21) (0.48) (1.04) -0.69 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ - ] - - 127.6 -38.32 -29.48 -29.48 
    (2.15)** (0.26) (0.31) (-0.611) 
   ...*(age-mage)  - -1.614 - -1.335 - - 
   (2.40)**  (1.37)   
Lost life-years term ( 4 )        
AS
i log(pdvl+1) [ - ] -30.73 -23.03 -57.94 -16.33 -43.93 -43.93 
  (5.88)*** (3.50)*** (3.88)*** (1.43) (4.43)*** ( -4.73)** 
   ...*(sd(U othr attr)-mean sd) [ + ] - - 84.86 -2.609 104.7 104.7 
    (1.54) (0.10) (4.74)*** (   3.8)** 
   ...*(sd(U this attr)-mean sd) [ - ] - - 64.72 -23.58 -36.28 -36.28 
    (1.55) (1.20) (2.92)*** ( -36.8)** 
   ...*(sasubrsk-msasubrsk)  - -40.74 - -40.28 - (what???) 
   (7.44)***  (6.97)***   
   ...*(cosubrsk-mcosubrsk)  - 33.15 - 32.62 - - 
   (4.19)***  (4.06)***   
   ...*(benefits never)  - 204.2 - 209.9 - - 
   (6.33)***  (6.35)***   
   ...*(min overest latency)  - 7.869 - 8.019 - - 
   (13.11)***  (12.31)***   
Observations  21111 21111 21111 21111 21111 21111 
Log L  -7682.953 -7050.867 -7670.404 -7042.261 -7603.081 -14645.34 
Iterations    40 40 40 1 
Marginal WTP for incr. in log(pdvi+1)        
5%  -11.37  -10.32  -18.1 (pending) 
50%  -8.58  -3.31  -17.72  
95%  -5.92  9.06  -9.9  
Marginal WTP for incr. in log(pdvl+1)        
5%  -11.97  -34.65  -41.43  
50%  -9.11  -.93  -7.49  
95%  -6.64  32.46  .34  
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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 Table 4:  Sizes of the effects of dissimilarity variables on estimated marginal utilities (Model SD5) 
Denominator of WTP
                            
In numerator of WTP
                                       

Dissimilarity variables normalized 
so that sample mean = 0 
Income term ( 1 ) Sick-years term (
2 ) 
Recovered-years 
term ( 3 ) 
Lost life-years 
term ( 4 ) 
MU at “mean” dissimilarity = 1.514 -7.124 -33.92 -20.23 
Effects of other-attribute utility 
dissimilarity (percentiles):     
5th  2.24 -38.04 -49.38 -47.83 
25th  2.01 -28.85 -44.52 -38.91 
50th  1.68 -16.37 -37.64 -27.48 
75th  1.19 6.03a -27.63 -8.16 
95th  0.21 50.81a -4.99 30.20a 
Effects of own-attribute utility 
dissimilarity (percentiles):     
5th  1.01 20.08a -35.90 -7.53 
25th  1.12 12.77a -35.90 -10.76 
50th  1.33 1.08a -35.90 -15.94 
75th  1.70 -18.80 -33.47 -25.07 
95th  2.67 -62.93 -25.82 -48.23 
a Unexpected signs on some of these fitted marginal utilities result from estimation without constraints.  In a 
non-linear adaptation of this model, it would be possible to estimate the negative of the logarithm of each 
marginal utility, and to allow this log-transformed parameter to shift systematically with the two types of 
dissimilarity measures.  This would constrain the fitted marginal utility to remain strictly negative. 
